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I. Contract Interpretation

Recent decisions have brought about a number of changes
in the area of contract interpretation. Although the general
trends seem clear and commendable, the details are often obscure and bothersome.
Whatever was left of the "face-of-the-document" approach
to parol evidence rule problems in California was buried in
1968. 1 The trial court must now learn the nature of the extrinsic evidence before it can properly rule on its admissibility.2
No written instrument can be interpreted or labeled clear and
unambiguous until all circumstances surrounding its execution
are known and considered. s
The requirement that a trial court may not exclude extrinsic
evidence out of hand but must consider its nature to determine
its admissibility is not a new legal proposition. 4 What is
rather different about the recent California decisions are directives such as the following: "Evidence of oral collateral
agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is
likely to be misled. The rule must therefore be based on the
credibility of the evidence. One such standard, adopted by
section 240 (1 )( b) of the Restatement of Contracts, permits
proof of a collateral agreement if it is such an agreement as
might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties
situated as were the parties to the written contract.,,5 "The
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1. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222,
65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968).
2. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222,
65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968);
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v G. W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company,
69 Ca1.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442
P.2d 641 (1968).
3. Estate of Russell, 69 Cal.2d 200,
70 Cal. Rptr. 561; 444 P.2d 353 (1968);
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal.
2d 525, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785, 446 P.2d
785 (1968).
4. See, for example, Restatement of
Contracts § 240(1)(b).
S. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222,
474

227. The fiction that the parol evidence rule rests on the presumed intent
of the parties to omit from the writing
certain terms discussed during prior negotiations seems to have been displaced.
The Masterson fiction seems to hold that
the exclusion of parol evidence is predicated on the lack of credibility of the
parties' recollections concerning oral,
as distinguished from simply extrinsic,
terms. A prior or contemporaneous extrinsic term need not have been oral.
Whether it was oral or written would
appear to have little or no bearing on
the question whether the parties might
naturally have left it in a collateral
form. Yet the written extrinsic term
CAL LAW 1970
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test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether
the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which
the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible."a
An analysis of Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto7 may offer
some guidance to the future direction of the law in this area.
If nothing else, the case certainly indicates that the issues are
not settled. The plaintiff developed a safety device for firearms and contracted with the defendants for distribution and
sale throughout the United States. Defendants expressly promised to sell a certain number each year, and the contract provided that should it fail to do so, the agreement would be subject to termination by plaintiff. Defendant did not meet his
quota, and plaintiff terminated the agreement and sued for
damages for defendant's failure to purchase the first year's
quota. Defendant contended that termination was intended
to be plaintiff's sole remedy. During the trial, defendant's
counsel asked one of his clients: "During the negotiations
that culminated in the execution of this contract between your
company and Delta Dynamics, was there any conversion or
discussion as to what would happen as far as (defendant) is
concerned if they failed to meet the minimum quota set up in
that contract?"8 An objection on the basis of the parol evidence rule was sustained, and no offer of proof was made.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. It was reversed.
As in the above-quoted cases, the majority opinion was
written by Chief Justice Traynor. The opinion finds that defendant's express promise to sell a given quota clearly implied
a promise to purchase that number from plaintiff and that
would presumably be the more credible
and the less likely of the two to "mislead the fact finder." The Masterson
opinion treats credibility and what might
naturally have been left out of the written contract as analogous approaches.
It does not appear to this writer that
they are.
6. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.
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W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442
P.2d 641 (1968).
7. 69 Cal.2d 525, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785,
446 P.2d 785 (1968); modified 69 AC
859.
8. 69 Cal.2d 525, 527, 529, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 786, 787.
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"[n]ormally the breach of such a promise would give rise to
an action for damages."9 The Court found, however, that the
termination clause could have been intended to spell out with
specificity the condition on which Delta could terminate the
contract or could have been intended to set forth the exclusive
remedy which was to be available to Delta. Since the language was "fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended for"10 the trial court was held to have committed reversible error in sustaining the objection to the defendant's question.
One of the more significant aspects of the dissent in this
case is the identity of its author. In Masterson v. Sine ll and
Pacific Gas & Elec. Company v. G. W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Company/2 Justice Mosk joined in the majority of the
five-to-two· decision. He authored the dissent in the four-tothree decision of Delta Dynamics which contains the following: "Although I had misgivings at the time, I must confess to
joining the majority in both of those cases. [Masterson and
Pacific Gas & Electric Co.]. Now, however, that the majority
deem negotiations leading to execution of contracts admissible, the trend has become so mistakenly ominous that I must
urge a halt."13 In light of the prospective change in membership of the court,14 it seems fair to speculate that additional
words may yet be forthcoming on the subject.
The differences in the positions of the Traynor and Mosk
opinions on the extrinsic evidence issue in Delta Dynamics
may not be as great as they appear on the surface. The Mosk
opinion emphasizes the point that the question that the trial
court found to be objectionable specified "during the negotiations.
,,15 (Emphasis by the Court). The majority
opinion notes that the pretrial conference order raised the is-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/16

9. 69 Cal.2d 525, 529, 72 Cal. Rptr.
785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 788.
10. 69 Cal.2d 525, 528, 72 Cal. Rptr.
785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 787.
11. 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr.
545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968).
12. 69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561,
442 P.2d 641 (1968).
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13. 69 Cal.2d 525, 531,72 Cal. Rptr.
785, 789, 446 P.2d 785, 789.
14. The Retirement of Chief Justice
Traynor.
15. 69 Cal.2d 525, 529, 72 Cal. Rptr.
785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 787.
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sue of the meaning of the cancellation clause and contends
that "..
[T]he substance, purpose and relevance of the
offered evidence was known to the court, and no more complete offer or proof was required."ls From this, it would
appear that Delta Dynamics need not be interpreted as authorizing introduction of all negotiations that led to a written contract, as the dissenting opinion suggests. It may have merely
repeated the Pacific Gas & Electric Co. position that extrinsic
agreements or understandings can be considered where the
language of the writing is justly susceptible to either of the two
interpretations for which the parties contend.
There were a number of decisions from the Courts of Appeal in this area. What would formerly have been a proper
exclusion of parol evidence was found to be error;17 what
might have appeared to be unwarranted reliance on parol evidence was found to be proper. IS And where separate consideration existed to support a finding that a true collateral agreement or contract existed, that agreement was enforceable in
its own right. 19

II. Illegality
The defense of illegality was raised in a variety of fact settings in recent cases. The results were mixed.
The Third District Court of Appeal decided two cases involving debts allegedly arising in connection with gambling
activities. In Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs,20 the assignee of
the owners of duly licensed Nevada gambling casinos sought
to enforce payment of checks which the casinos had honored
and which had been returned for lack of sufficient funds.
Prior Nevada cases have denied enforcement of gambling
16. 69 Cal.2d 525, 527, fn.l, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 786, fn.1, 446 P.2d 786, fn.t.
17. Connell v. Zaid, 268 Cal. App.2d
788, 74 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1969); Estrada
v. Darling-Crose Machine Co., 275 Cal.
App. - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1969).
18. Davidson v. Welch, 270 Cal. App.
2d 220, 75 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1969). For
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further discussion of this case, see
Moreau, TORTS, in this volume.
19. Wright v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.,
274 Cal. App. - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1969).
20. 266 Cal. App. 2d 61, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1968).
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debts! and a prior California decision denied recovery on a
check cashed by the owner of a casino at the gaming tables.!
The Lane case, however, involved checks cashed at cashier's
cages in gambling casinos. The casinos offered food, liquor,
entertainment, and hotel rooms in addition to gambling opportunities, and the defendant was admittedly free to "walk
out" with the money. However, the uncontradicted evidence
produced by the defense was that the defendant lost all of the
funds gambling at the particular casino that cashed each
check. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed.
In the Lane case there were no findings of fact. The Court
of Appeal noted, however, that under the new Evidence Code
the presumption of legality is not evidence,s and concluded
that there was no substantial evidence from which the trial
court could have avoided finding that the checks were cashed
for the purpose of providing funds to gamble with the "donor.,,4
Bristow v. Morelli 5 involved a plaintiff who was a patron
at a licensed card room and a defendant who owned and operated the establishment. Defendant acted as banker and sold
chips but did not participate in the draw poker game. At
defendant's request, plaintiff "cashed in" a quantity of chips
during the course of an evening in exchange for defendant's
note. At the conclusion of the evening, plaintiff received defendant's oral promise to pay the value of plaintiff's remaining chips.
The Court affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff on these
obligations, noting that these obligations were not gaming
debts, they were not loans made for the purpose of enabling
either party to gamble, and the defendant was not a participant in the gambling activities which were being conducted.
1. Wolpert v. Knight, 74 Nev. 322,
330 P.2d 1023 (1958).
2. Hamilton v. Abadjian, 30 Cal.2d
49, 179 P.2d 804 (1947).
3. Evid. Code § 600(a); Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs, 266 Cal. App.2d 61,
65, 71 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/16

4. The location of the cashier's cage,
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the fact that the defendant had been
flown to Nevada on a so-called gambler's flight, the fact that the defendant
had just left the gambling tables and
returned directly to them, and other
facts peculiar to this case no doubt influenced the Court's determination.
5. 270 Cal. App.2d 894, 76 Cal. Rptr.
203 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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These factors were held to distinguish Bristow from the Lane
case.
It would appear that advancing cash in the form of loans
or cashing checks under circumstances where it is apparent
that the funds are likely to be used for gambling may result in
an unenforceable obligation. Lane involved the additional
element that the party cashing the checks was the party with
whom the check writer intended to gamble. It is not clear
whether this is a necessary element for denying enforceability
of the obligation.
Section 7031 of the Business & Professional Code requires
a contractor to plead and prove the fact that he was licensed in
order to enforce a construction contract. In Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange6 an unlicensed contractor brought
action for the tort of fraud, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants fraudulently induced plaintiffs to enter the construction
contracts and fraudulently induced them to perform work
thereon. The Court held that, while section 7031 barred recovery in contract because of the implied illegality of plaintiffs' performance as an unlicensed contractor, it did not bar
recovery for tort, and the summary judgment for defendants
was reversed.
While one must agree that there is a distinction between
contract and tort theories of recovery, it would seem fair to
note that the apparent purpose of section 7031 is neatly
avoided. However, the case was not without precedent. 7
The right to receive restitution for benefits conferred pursuant to an illegal contract was again raised in Griffis v. Squire. 8
Quoting from Norwood v. Judd, a 1949 case,9 the Griffis
Court noted that restitution has been granted where: (1) the
transaction is complete; (2) no serious moral turpitude is involved; (3) the defendant bears the greater moral fault, and
( 4) unjust enrichment would result from denial of restitution.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

6. 269 Cal. App.2d 299, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 788 (1969).
7. Grant v. Weatherholt, 123 Cal.
App.2d 34, 266 P.2d 185 (1954).
8. 267 Cal. App.2d 461, 73 Cal. Rptr.
CAL LAW 1970

154 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see York, REMEDIES in this
volume.
9. 93 Cal. App.2d 276, 209 P.2d 24
(1949).
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In Griffis, however, the Court expressly conceded that there
was no finding that defendant was guilty of the greater moral
fault, and it was quite evident from the facts that this was not
the case. Despite this factor, the Court concluded that restitution was a proper remedy, citing Hainey v. Narigon. 10 The
apparent test to be applied is simply whether the forfeiture resulting from nonenforcement of the contract is disproportionately harsh, considering the nature of the illegality involved.
An unreported decision of the Third District Court of Appeall l would sharply restrict the application of the Subdivision
Lands Act. 12 Plaintiff vendor had engaged in more than five
transactions over a period of years with respect to a single
parcel of property by selling and encumbering various parts
of it. Defendant vendee had contracted to purchase approximately 10 acres, which constituted a substantial portion of
the remaining property. That vendor had given no notice to
the Real Estate Commissioner and had obtained no public report was advanced by the defendant as an illegal act within the
meaning of the act.
In affirming a trial court holding that the contract was enforceable, the Court stated: "[Vendor] never subdivided his
property into lots or homes for sale to the public and [vendee],
as a buyer of the major part of [vendor's] remaining land, was
not a member of the buying public whom the subdivision law
aimed to protect. The isolated and disconnected transactions
by [vendor] did not make him a subdivider or subject any of
his transactions, . . . to the subdivision law."13

III. Statute of Frauds
Detrimental reliance on an oral contact within the statute of
frauds has been recognized in some fact situations as a basis
10. 247 Cal. App.2d 528, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 638 (1966).
11. Tougerousse v. Koshell, 3 Civ.
No. 12,093 and 12,094; Hearing denied.
See generally Rule 976 (b)(c) California
Rules of Court (standard of publica-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/16
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tion). See also 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 608
(1966).
12. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 11000 et.
seq.
13. Opinion, 3 Civ. No. 12,093, dated October 31, 1969, p. 11.
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for enforcing the oral contract,14 but the problem remains as
to what reliance must be shown. In Carlson v. Richardson,16
vendee in an action for specific performance of an oral contract to sell a coastal homesite relied on vendor's assurance of
performance over a period of three years, and in doing so
"passed up opportunities" to buy other land. The Court rejected the contention that loss of the bargain and loss of opportunities to buy other property in a rising market were the
type of detrimental reliance that would suffice to remove the
agreement from the shelter of the statute. However, purchase
of a nearby property contemplated for use as a temporary
residence while a house was to be built on the disputed property might constitute such a detriment. The Court held that
the issue should have been submitted to the trier of fact.
Fellom v. Adams16 involved an action to enforce a note
given to a real estate agent for the balance of the commission
promised under an oral broker's contract. The Court affirmed
the holding that the moral obligation arising from a promise
unenforceable due to the statute of frauds furnishes adequate
consideration for a promissory note or other written promise
to pay.

IV. Assignments
The 1957 case of Fricker v. Uddo & Taormina CO. 17 involved a tomato grower who had assigned to the plaintiff a
right to receive moneys due to the grower from the defendant
canning company. Here it was held that the general rule that
rights of an assignee cannot be destroyed by payments made
by the debtor to the assignor after notice of assignment will
not be applied where such payments are necessary to secure
assignor's performance. The defendant canner in Fricker was
allowed to make advances to the grower in order to insure pro14. See, for example, Monarco v. Lo
Greco, 35 Cal.2d 621, 220 P.2d 737
(1950); Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal.
782, 106 P. 88 (1909).
15. 267 Cal. App.2d 204, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1968). For further discus-
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sion of this case, see York, REMEDIES,
in this volume.
16. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1969).
17. 48 Cal.2d 696, 312 P.2d 1085
(1957).
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duction of the crop even after assignee asserted his right to
receive payment. In Hoover v. Agriform Chemical Co./ 8
extension of the Fricker rule was denied. The debtor, Agriform, made periodic advances to the assignor, its local distributor, which were necessary to keep the assignor "afloat."
As a result of these advances, the distributor was constantly
in debt to Agriform and no moneys were ever paid to Mr.
Hoover, the assignee of a portion of the commissions that the
distributor earned.
The Court held that the Fricker case rule would apply only
where the advances to the assignor are necessary to perform
a particular contract that is to produce the right to the funds
that were assigned. "It does not encompass subsequent advances of a general nature to a going business engaged in
many transactions over a period of years . . ."19
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. James I. Barnes
Constr. Co./o the Fricker case and others were cited as author. when the existence of the
ity for the statement:"
assigned fund is dependent upon performance by the assignor
of an executory contract, the anticipatory debtor may do
whatever reasonably appears to be necessary to enable the assignor to perform the contract.,,1
V. Damages
In a matter of first impression in California, Lemat Corp.
v. Barri dealt with the remedy of the owner of the San Francisco Warriors, a profession basketball team franchised by the
National Basketball Association, in an action against one of
its players for breach of his employment contract. The contract was a standard form agreement in which Rick Barry
agreed to play exclusively for the Warriors for the 1966-67
season, and also granted to Lemat the option to renew for
18. 268
Rptr. 325
19. 268
Cal. Rptr.
20. 267
Rptr. 618

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/16
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Cal. App.2d 818, 74 Cal.
(1969).
Cal. App.2d 818, 822, 74
325, 328.
Cal. App.2d 931, 73 Cal.
(1968).

1. 267 Cal. App.2d 931, 937, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 618, 622.

2. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
240 (1969). For further discussion of
this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this
volume.
CAL LAW 1970
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the 1967-68 season. Lemat exercised its option, but Barry
entered into an agreement with the owner of the Oakland
Oaks, franchised by the American Basketball Association, to
play for the Oaks during the 1967-68 season. The Oaks'
owners agreed to indemnify Barry against any liabilities incurred by him as a result of his contract with the Oaks.
In Lemat's pleadings and the pretrial order, it was clear that
the prayer was for an injunction to prevent Barry from playing for the Oaks or in the alternative damages for loss of gate
receipts. However, during the trial, Lemat asked for an injunction to protect Lemat from further damage which would
result if Barry were allowed to play for the Oaks, and for
damages for loss of gate receipts resulting from its loss of the
right to display Barry, a player of "special, unique, unusual
and extraordinary character." The trial court found the matter of damages properly before it and made a finding as to the
amount of damages but granted relief only in the form of
an injunction against Barry's playing for the Oaks during the
1967-68 season.
The reviewing Court struck the finding of damages as surplusage and affirmed the trial court's position that Lemat was
not entitled to both injunctive relief and damages. s The opinion appears to take the position that damages in addition to an
injunction would give duplicate relief. While this may well
be true in some situations4 it appears to be a nonsequitur in
the case of an athlete or performer. An injunction might minimize the loss, but it does not eliminate it unless the effect is
to induce the individual to fulfill his contract. The force of
the Court's position on this issue is weakened by the fact the
3. But see Harvey v. White, 213 Cal.
App.2d 275, 28 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1963),
which involved the sale of an accounting services business in which the seller
covenanted to refrain from competing
in that area for 5 years. On breach,
the Court held: "If, without excuse,
appellants violated the covenant not to
compete, respondents were entitled to
the injunction they sued for and were
further entitled to such damages as they

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

CAL LAW 1970

might have suffered by reason of that
violation. . . . [I]t was incumbent
upon the trial court to proceed further,
to find the damages suffered by the
breach of the covenant not to compete,
and to enter judgment accordingly."
4. In the typical situation of a breach
or threatened breach of a negative covenant, e.g., a covenant not to compete,
the granting of injunctive relief would
normally be a complete remedy.
483
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opinion gives two alternative bases for the result. It states:
"Lemat's claim for damages could acquire significance only if
its request for injunctive relief was denied or was found to be
inappropriate under the circumstances."5 The Court also
stated, citing Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett6
as authority, that "damages in a situation of this kind are
speculative and uncertain and practically impossible to ascertain."7
The case does not appear to have brought any measurable
degree of understanding or clarification to a difficult area of
law.
VI. Measure of Damages
A salaried individual quits his job to buy a franchise and
go into business. When the franchisor breaches the contract,
there is no basis for proving loss of profits as an element of
damages because the operation is not yet an established
business with a history of earnings. Prospective profits are too
speculative to be compensable. 8 In Runyan v. Pacific Air Industries, Inc.,9 the trial court included as an item of damages
the amount of wages which the plaintiff would have earned
at his former job which he quit to obtain a photogrammetric
franchise from defendants. The Court of Appeal held this
to be improper noting that the franchise was not an employment contract, and that the parties in no way contemplated
that plaintiff would receive any compensation in the nature
of a salary. "The two considerations are entirely separate,
5. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal.
App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
But compare Code of Civ. Proc. § 580.
"The relief granted to the plaintiff, if
there be no answer, cannot exceed that
which he shall have demanded in his
complaint; but in any other case, the
court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue."

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/16

6. 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 19 Ohio Ops.
2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (1961).
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7. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal.
App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240.
8. Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal.
494, 200 P. 11 (1921).
9. 271 Cal. App.2d -,76 Cal. Rptr.
701 (1969). This case was granted a
hearing before the California Supreme
Court. As this volume goes to press,
the result of the appeal based on the
issue of lost wages is still being awaited.
For further discussion of this case, see
York, REMEDIES, in this volume.
CAL LAW 1970
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salary on the one hand and entrepreneurial activity on the
other, and there is nothing to justify an award of the equivalent of salary to plaintiff."lo
The reversal appears to have been arbitrary. Where a
contract breach involves a new enterprise, the profits of which
cannot be shown with adequate certainty, California cases
have allowed plaintiffs to recover the cost of preparing to
carry out the contract. This has been held to include the
earnings which plaintiff would have received from his former
business had he continued to pursue it. l l It would not appear
improper to have held that it also includes the earnings which
plaintiff would have received in his former employment.
VII. Implied Contracts-Unordered Goods

The addition of sections 1584.5 and 1584.6 to the Civil
Code brings relief to recipients of unwanted merchandise. 12
10. Runyan v. Pacific Air Industries,
Inc., 271 Cal. App.2d -, -, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 703.
11. Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal.
494, 200 P. 11 (1921).
12. Section 1584.5, added to the Civil Code in 1969, reads: "1584.5. No
person, firm, partnership, association or
corporation, or agent or employee thereof, shall, in any manner, or by any
means, offer for sale goods, wares, or
merchandise, where the offer includes
the voluntary and unsolicited sending
of such goods, wares, or merchandise
not actually ordered or requested by
the recipient, either orally or in writing.
The receipt of any such goods, wares,
or merchandise shall for all purposes be
deemed an unconditional gift to the recipient who may use or dispose of such
goods, wares, or merchandise in any
manner he sees fit without any obligation on his part to the sender.
"If after any such receipt deemed to
be an unconditional gift under this section, the sender continues to send bill
statements or requests for payment

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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with respect thereto, an action may be
brought by the recipient to enjoin such
conduct, in which action there may also
be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs to the prevailing party."
(Emphasis added)
"Section 2. Section 1584.6 is added
to the Civ. Code, to read:
"1584.6. If a person is a member of
an organization which makes retail
sales of any goods, wares, or merchandise to its members, and the person notifies the organization of his termination of membership by certified mail,
return receipt requested, any unordered
goods, wares, or merchandise which are
sent to the person after 30 days following execution of the return receipt for
the certified letter by the organization,
shall for all purposes be deemed unconditional gifts to the person, who may
use or dispose of the goods, wares, or
merchandise in any manner he sees fit
without any obligation on his part to
the organization.
"If the termination of a person's membership in such organization breaches
any agreement with the organization,
485
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It is apparent that the scope of section 1584.5 is not so broad

as to include all unordered goods, but will apply where the
sending is done voluntarily and for the purpose of offering
them for sale to the recipient. The provision for attorneys'
fees and costs to the prevailing party should be welcomed by
the harassed consumer, but it is far short of the earlier statute13 on the same subject, which would have provided for
"exemplary damages and costs incurred by the recipient" but
which was apparently superseded by the later enactment of
Chapter 400.
VIII. Performance-Sufficiency
U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Vadnais14 involved complex questions of burden of proof of substantial performance. Plaintiff
nothing in this section shall relieve the
person from liability for damages to
which he might be otherwise subjected
to pursuant to law, but he shall not be
subject to any damages with respect to
any goods, wares, or merchandise which
are deemed unconditional gifts to him
under this section.
"If after any receipt deemed to be
an unconditional gift under this section,
the sender continues to send bill statements or requests for payment with respect thereto, an action may be brought
by the recipient to enjoin such conduct,
in which action there may also be
awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs to the prevailing party."
13. It is unclear which of the two
additions of Section 1584.5 to the Civil
Code, enacted in 1969, represents the
intent of the legislature. Assembly Bill
77, filed July 8, 1969 calls for the remedy quoted in the last footnote.
Hereafter appears Senate Bill 323
filed June 27, 1969, also purporting to
be "an act to add Section 1584.5 to the
Civil Code," enacted into law.
1969 Stats. Ch. 265:
Section 1. Section 1584.5 is added
to the Civil Code to read:
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"1584.5. No person, firm, partnership, association or corporation, or
agent or employee thereof, shall, in
any manner, or by any means, offer for
sale goods, wares or merchandise where
the offer includes the voluntary and
unsolicited sending of such goods, wares
or merchandise not actually ordered or
requested by the recipient, either orally
or in writing. The receipt of any such
goods, wares, or merchandise shall for
all purposes be deemed an unconditional gift to the recipient who may use
or dispose of such goods, wares or merchandise in any manner he sees fit without any obligation on his part to the
sender.
"If after any such receipt deemed to
be an unconditional gift under this section, the sender continues to send bill
statements or requests for payment with
respect thereto, an action may be
brought by the recipient to enjoin such
conduct, in which action there may also
be judgment for exemplary damages
and costs incurred by the recipient."
(Emphasis added.)
14. 270 Cal. App.2d 520, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1969).
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contracted to manufacture and deliver over $400,000 worth
of pipe to defendant's construction job. The pipe was all
eventually delivered, but deliveries were very late, apparently
due to plaintiff's efforts to obtain specification changes before
commencing manufacture. Defendant buyer paid over $300,000, but withheld approximately $100,000 as a setoff for
liabilities incurred as the result of defendant's delay.
Plaintiff sued for the balance due on the contract and defendant cross complained for damages arising from plaintiff's
breach. Neither plaintiff nor defendant introduced any evidence as to the amount of damages caused by plaintiff's delay,
although it was apparent from various facts that some damages
had been sustained. The court gave judgment for defendant
on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to substantially perform the contract and gave judgment for the plaintiff (cross
'defendant) on the cross complaint on the grounds that there
was no proof of the amount of damages which the defendant
sustained. Both j~dgments were appealed and both reversed.
Quoting from Lowy v. United Pac. Ins. CO. 15 the reviewing
Court in U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Vadnais concluded that substantial performance had occurred and the defendant became
obligated to pay the contract price less damages sustained unless there was a ". . . combination of these two factors:
( 1) substantial omissions or deviations resulting from (2) wilful or intentional action (or inaction) on the part of the party
claiming that he substantially performed.,,16 Since there was
no evidence submitted concerning the extent of the damage
caused by plaintiff's delay, the Court stated: "The question
then is: Who has the burden of proving such damages?"17
It was concluded that the burden lay on the defendant.
As applied in this case, the allocation of the burden of proof
does not appear objectionable. Applied to a construction contract, however, it appears to indicate that, having proved performance that roughly approximates what was agreed on, the
15. 67 Cal.2d 87, 60 Cal. Rptr. 225,
429 P.2d 577 (1967).
16. 270 Cal. App.2d 520, 530, 76
Cal. Rptr. 44, 51.
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17. 270 Cal. App.2d 520, 527, 76
Cal. Rptr. 44, 48.
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contractor may retire to watch the owner prove the dollar
value of the breaches. Failure to develop the required certainty of damages will result in the owner's paying the full
contract price. It would not appear unjust to include within
the plaintiff's burden of proof of substantial performance proof
of the dollar value of his derelictions.
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